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INTRODUCTION
The regulation of migration-any regulation of
migration-is inherently discriminatory against prospective
migrants.' Immigration policy determines who gets in, often
consigning those who do not, to less advantageous living
conditions in their country of origin. After all, most migrants are
simply interested in improving their quality of life.2 Quantitative
restrictions and qualitative selection criteria imposed by national
immigration policies constitute "at-the-border" discrimination.
This is augmented by "behind-the-border" measures that treat
immigrants less favorably than citizens after admission (such as
lower levels of social protection). Neither "at-the-border" nor
Sylvan M. Cohen Chair in Law, Hebrew University of jerusalem; Visiting
Professor, University of Virginia Law School.
1. "Discriminatory" here is not a value-statement, it is merely referring to
objectively differential treatment: " [T]he term, 'discrimination,' has value implications
that can never be completely cradicated, though they can be Stcrilizcd for specific
empirical and descriptive purposes." See Kenneth Arrow, The Theory ofDiscimination, itn
DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETs 3, 3 (Orley Ashentelter & Albert Rees cds., 1973).
2. Among migrants, the "vast majority . . . move in search of better economic
opportunities." Only ten percent are considered refugees whose migration stems from
a fear of persecution. See INT'L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2005:
COSTS AND BLNEITS OF INTLRNATIONAL MIGRATION 379-81 (2005).
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"behind-the-border" distinctions sit well with egalitarian ideals,
but their reduction or removal is often perceived as a threat to
the cohesion and welfare of political communities in migration-
receiving states, including those who consider equality to be a
core social value. A tension therefore emerges between
egalitarian mores and communitarian concerns.4 The debate on
immigration policy in liberal, democratic, immigration-receiving
states can thus be formulated as a debate over boundaries of
unequal treatment of immigrants. To the extent that "open
borders"-advocated by some cosmopolitans-are not
politically viable (and would clash with communitarian
perspectives), it becomes necessary to ask what are the morally
permissible boundaries of "behind-the-border" discrimination?
This communitarian-egalitarian tension is well-reflected in
the ambivalence of international law. It is generally accepted
that immigration regulation is the state's prerogative." With few
exceptions, states are not obligated to introduce immigrants to
their territory, determining conditions for admittance (and
citizenship) as they see fit. However, various sources of
3. Cominunitarians have argued that state-based distinctions, including
restrictions on immigration, are consistent wvith egalitarian principles. See, e.g., Michael
Blake, Distibutie justice, State Coercion and Autonomy, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 257 (2001);
Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Globalfustice 33 PHIL. & PUB.AFF. 113. 129 (2005).
4. I use the term communitarian here broadly, referring to any approach that
attaches m1oral significance to historical and/or cultural communjities, from which one
can derive the "respect that foreigners owe to a historic comiunity and its internal
life." Michael Walzer, The Woral Standing oj States: A Response to Four Critics, 9 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 209, 212 (1980).
5. Compare Audrey Macklin, Freeing Migration from the State: Michael Trebilcock on
Aigration Policy, 60 U. TORONTO I.]. 315, 320 (2010), with Audrey Macklin, A Theory
About Theories of Migration, and a Comment About Michael Trebilcock's Theoly (2009).
available at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/conferences2/Trebilcock09
Macklin. pdf (" [T]he concern animating theoretical debates about migration is less
about liberty than about somie version of equality.").
6. See generaly Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 RLV.
Pot. 251 (1987).
7. References here to "cosmopolitanism" and "coLmunitarianisn" deliberately
condense a wide spctrum of approaches. For a imore nuanced survey of different
approaches to immigration see Michael j. Trebilcock, The Law and Economics of
humigration Poli,. 5 AM. L. & ECON. RLV. 271. 294-96 (2003).
8. T. Alexander Alcinikoff, International Legal Norms and Migration: A Report. in
MIGRATION & INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Vincent
Chetail eds., 2003).
9. The chief exceptions being asylun-seckers under the 1951 United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the 1967 United Nations Protocol
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international law including labor law, 10 human rights law," and
economic law,"1 express a generally negative position towards
discrimination against immigrants (though for divergent
reasons). The aspiration of equal treatment of immigrants
challenges the discrimination that is inherent in the general
right to exclude, yet also cohabits with it.
This inconsistency is even more intricate because equal
treatment does not necessarily walk hand in hand with
inclusiveness either. Quite the contrary: rigid applications of
"behind-the-border" non-discriminatory treatment of migrants
can constitute effective barriers to immigration. Indeed,
egalitarian ideals and rules of nondiscrimination may have the
counterintuitive effect of restricting immigration-greater
protection of rights leading to a lower number of migrant
beneficiaries.' 3 If disparity between the quality of life drives
migration, then inflexible equal treatment may raise the beam
for migration higher, deterring it and perpetuating global
inequality. Drawing the moral bounds of justifiable
discrimination therefore has real implications for the design of
national and international immigration law and policy. This is
the case with respect to temporary migration, particularly in
areas of low-skilled labor, where the economic demand for
Relating to the Status of Reiugees. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 268. Refugees are not the subject of this Article's
analysis.
10. See Convention Concerning Migration for Employment, July 1. 1949. I.L.O.
No. 97, art. 6, 1616 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter ILO 97]; see also INTI LABOUR OFFICE,
MU TILATERAL FRAMEWORK ON LABOUR MIGRATION: NON-BINDING PRINCIPIES AN)
GUIDELINES FOR A RIGHTS-BASLD APPROACH To LABOUR MIGRATION §8.4.4 (2006).
11. Stemming from the general rule on equality in accordance wvith the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art 3, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1((PR]. For discussion, see infra Part IV.
12. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the 'World Trade Organization, art. I(2) (d), Legal
Instunents-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter GATS]
(precluding, generally, discrimination between sources of temporary service providers
who are essentially labor migrants). For a discussion on the relationship between
economic nondiscrimination and human rights-based equal protection see also Toiner
Broude, The Wost-Favoured Nation Principle, Equal Protection, and Migration Policy, 24
GLO. IMMIGR. LJ. 553 (2010).
13. See Martin Ruhs & Philip Martin, Numbers vs. Rights: Trade-Offs and Guest
Worker Programs, 41 INT'. MIGRATION REV. 249, 254 (2008).
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foreigners in migration-receiving countries is often steep, and
the temptation to provide them with fewer rights is high.14
Without prejudice to the fundamental debate over "open
borders" and the general liberalization of migration, in this
article I develop a plausible case in defense of (some) "behind-
the-border" discrimination in migration regulation. The overall
claim is that within identifiable limits, it is morally acceptable,
and at times even preferable, to treat immigrants less favorably
than residents.
The framework of analysis I employ is a specific application
of the "Minimal Liberal" rule of social choice developed by
Amartya Sen in his initial exposition of the Liberal Paradox, as
explained below.1 Unlike the weak Paretian decision rule with
which it will be contrasted, in the Minimal Liberal framework
the collective efficiency of decisional outcomes is not
considered. Instead, each participating actor can determine the
outcome of at least one choice between alternatives, as an
expression of individual liberty. When relevant actors represent
host- and sender-societies, the results are illuminating.
In Part I, I will provide justification for the employment of a
Minimal Liberal framework in the context of migration
regulation. In Part II, I will set out the Minimal Liberal defense
of discrimination in migration. In Part III, I will apply the same
framework to discriminatory treatment that simultaneously
constitutes a violation of migrants' substantive human rights,
arguing that this latter type of discrimination cannot be justified.
In Part IV, I apply the framework to two different forms of
"behind-the-border" discrimination in migration regulation-
immigration-encouraging discrimination, and immigration-
deterring discrimination-showing that while both of these are
defensible, migration-encouraging discrimination is preferred.
In the conclusion, I summarize the defense of discrimination in
migration regulation and its implications for public policy.
14. On the morality of diflerential conditions for guest workers, see Robert Mayer,
Guestworkers and Exploitation, 67 RLV. POL. 311, 322 (2005).
15. See generally Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78.1. POL. ECON.
152 (1970).
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1. THE RELE VANCE OF THE MINIMAL LIBERAL
FRAMEWORK TO MIGR4 TION REGUL4 TION
The qualified defense of discrimination in migration
regulation is neither a general justification nor a reproach of
migration restrictions, nor of exclusionary communitarian
approaches to immigration; and by no means is it a rejection or
an embrace of egalitarianism or cosmopolitan views of
migration. Rather, it is a recognition of the communitarian-
egalitarian tension and the need to reconcile it through a moral
analytical framework that is not substantially tilted towards
either end of the spectrum, but rather engages in a process of
public reasoning between them. Moreover, the aim of this
reasoning is not to present the types of discrimination defended
here as mere second-best compromises or least-worst policies,
but to justify them as morally preferable not only to unbridled
discrimination but also, in some constellations, to purist
nondiscrimination.
This said, the analysis is not a paternalist justification of
discrimination against immigrants merely because in some way it
might be good for them. A crude argument in favor of
discrimination might rely on migrants' supposed objective
interests as perceived by immigration-receiving states, pointing
out that some migrants who suffer discrimination in their host-
country may nevertheless be better off than they would have
been with no migration at all.16 However, this argument is
deficient. It rests mainly on the potential migrants' objectively
inferior initial condition, inferring from it a preference for
migration with discrimination-any discrimination. Taking into
account these migrants' presumed objective welfare, this
argument ignores their first overall subjective preference, which
would surely be immigration with equality. Also, it assumes that
incumbents in immigration-receiving states prefer
discriminatory treatment of immigrants. However, from their
communitarian perspective they might actually prefer full
exclusion of immigrants, and from egalitarian viewpoints they
might prefer nondiscriminatory immigration. Indeed,
16. For a more sophisticatcd yet related argument, see Mayer, supra note 14 at 319
(suggesting Lha[ moderately exploitativc guest worker programs are acceptable if the
most likely non-exploitative alternative worsens the plight of the disadvantaged).
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aggregating the conflicting moral sentiments of incumbents
leads to the conclusion that to them, immigration accompanied
by discrimination might be a third-best, first-worst alternative-a
necessary evil.
Arguably, the question of whether discrimination against
immigrants is morally justified should rather take into account
the views and preferences of both incumbents and of
immigrants who might suffer discriminatory treatment, because
the interests of both would be affected. A plausible way of doing
this would be to model a global society that includes both
communities, and then to apply some rule of social choice to
their preferences.
The initial problem with this approach, of course, is that
both strict communitarians and cosmopolitans would object to
the application of a decision-making rule that takes into account
the preferences of both groups. In a communitarian's ideal
world, while acknowledging that migration-receiving and
migration-sending states are part of the same international
society, 17 there would be no need or justification for the
receiving community to consult the preferences of potential
immigrants. Incumbents would be free to design a policy
according to their community's interests and values. By contrast,
in a cosmopolitan's ideal world, there would be no need or even
justification to consult the invariably unjust preferences of the
incumbents.
Reality is more complicated than both theories, which, for
all their intellectual merit, describe and justify ideal-type world
orders of justice. In fact, migrants cannot ignore the preferences
of immigration-receiving states who hold legal power to regulate
entry; incumbents cannot ignore immigrants' preferences,
because their control over migration is de facto limited, as
evidenced by the high numbers of undocumented immigrants, 8
17. International society is not necessarily a community, but may be understood as
a society composed of distinct communities, with varying degrees of political pluralism.
See generally Michael Walzer, International Society: What is the Best that We Can Do?
(June 2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at hIIp://,w.sss.ias.edu/files/
papers/papereight.pdf.
18. See GORDON H. HANSON, COUNCIL ON FORLIGN RELATIONS SPLCIAL REPORT:
THL ECONOMIC LOGIC OF ILLEGAL IMIilGRATION No. 26, at 3 (2007) ("In the past Len
years, the US population of illegal immigrants has risen from five million to nearly
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and also because their governments invariably allow some
immigrants to enter their territory, de jure. The question,
therefore, warrants scrutiny through realistic theory, taking into
account the preferences of both migrants and incumbents,
extracting concessions and compromises from otherwise
'transcendental' or ideal-type paradigms. As Sen has written,
instead of clinging to unrealistic theories in the pursuit of social
justice, "what is needed ... is an agreement, based on public
reasoning, on rankings of alternatives that can be realized"; '
furthermore, "in seeking resolution by public reasoning, there is
clearly a strong case for not leaving out the perspectives and
reasoning presented by anyone whose assessments are relevant,
either because their interests are involved, or because their ways
of thinking about these issues throw light on particular
judgments."20 These words ring especially true with respect to
migration, a field that lies well within the realm of "non-ideal"
theory.21
Recourse to public reasoning involving both incumbents
and migrants is generally justified by the exigencies of the real
world in which people live and die and migrate. In this real
world, constituencies are not faced with a binary decision (to
allow or disallow immigration), but rather with much more
textured policy choices that translate into a ternary decision: no
immigration, immigration with "behind-the-border"
discrimination, and/or immigration with equality.
Cosmopolitans who would ideally choose open, egalitarian
borders are forced to consider their priorities in the face of
restrictive immigration policies. And communitarians who
would ideally choose to isolate or protect their community must
nevertheless acknowledge their own propensity to introduce
immigrants and hence, the need to choose between
discriminatory and egalitarian terms.
twvelve million, prompting angry charges that the country has lost control over its
borders.").
19. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OFJUSTICE 17 (Allen Lane ed., 2009).
20. Id. at 44.
21. Although Sen pays tribute to Rawls by critiquing his transcendentalism, Rawls
was cognizant of the strengths of "non-ideal" theory, in which one seeks "policies and
courses of action that are morally permissible and politically possible as well as likely to
be effective." JOH1N RAWLS, THE L.AW OF PEOPLES: NVITH "THE IDEA OF PUBLIC RLASON
REVISITED" 89 (1999).
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Crucially, turning to such a process does not ex ante
prejudice the substantive outcome towards either cosmopolitan
or communitarian ends of the spectrum. A cosmopolitan
approach would have already excluded the forms of
discrimination contemplated here, through its advocacy of both
open borders and equal treatment. A communitarian approach
would have led to unilateral migration policy reflective of a
general disinclination towards immigration, perhaps banning it
entirely. In contrast, a process of consultation with the
preferences of both incumbents and immigrants can be
outcome-neutral, yet reasoned, leaving the question of "behind-
the-border" discrimination open to debate. However, we have
still to determine the rule of social choice to be applied to these
preferences. The method of aggregating preferences must also
be ex ante outcome-neutral.
One obviously applicable decision-making rule of social
choice would be Pareto optimality. A weak Pareto rule would
seek to identify policy on immigration and discrimination that
cannot better reflect the preferences of incumbents, without
worsening the position of migrants, in terms of its preferences,
assuming that this reflects aggregate welfare. Weak Pareto
efficiency would, however, be a flawed social choice paradigm,
because it would be prejudicially cosmopolitan. Paretian logic is
ab defintio a method of considering the preferences of relevant
agents, for the purpose of optimizing the efficiency of the
combined/ aggregate set of agents. Here, a Pareto analysis would
identify the optimally efficient rule for the combined (global)
population of migrants and incumbents. This goes beyond a
decision rule that merely takes into account the preferences of
both communities, because it treats them as a single community
-it is the aggregated welfare of all groups that is to be
promoted/ maximized, not the relative welfare of each group.
This background cosmopolitanism of Paretian analysis is borne
out by the results of the analysis below, in which it consistently
pushes towards immigration rules that are both inclusive and
non-discriminatory-a cosmopolitan ideal. Furthermore, this
suggests that in the immigration context, Pareto efficiency has a
blind spot with respect to possible distinctions between different
forms of discrimination (i.e., all discrimination is Pareto
inefficient, period).
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An alternative to the Paretian paradigm, engaging
preferences of both incumbents and immigrants without
considering them as components of a single group, would be
the Minimal Liberal approach. It is suitable here because it
deliberately disrupts Paretian logic. Under the Liberal Paradox,
Minimal Liberal choices will never be Pareto optimal." The
Minimal Liberal framework has no prerequisite of broad
egalitarianism. Yet it takes into account the preferences of
different groups under equal terms: each group gets to
determine at least one social choice. Thus, if there are three
alternatives for the final decision-x, y, and z-there are three
choices to be made: x/y, x/z, and y/z. Each group may determine
the outcome of at least one of these binary decisions. In the
present case, these choices would include, to begin with, three
alternatives: immigration with equal treatment, immigration
with discriminatory treatment, and finally, no immigration. The
Minimal Liberal framework provides a rule of social choice that
is neither prejudiced towards open migration nor to the
question of "behind-the-border" discrimination.
The Minimal Liberal framework is not necessarily to be
preferred in analyzing migration policy, but it has the distinct
advantage of being relatively neutral with respect to the
communitarian-egalitarian/cosmopolitan debate and non-
prejudicial towards a particular result, focused on public
reasoning in a particular way. Let us see where it takes us.
II. THE GENERAL CASE OF DISCRIAHA4TION
Consider two representative individuals with distinct
preferences in migration policy: Alice is an egalitarian-
communitarian in a high-income, immigration-receiving state,
whose socio-political community attaches great importance to
egalitarian values; Roberto is a prospective low-skilled immigrant
from a low-income state, whose chief concern is to improve his
quality of his life. Let Roberto and Alice constitute international
society, each representative of their social community. What
22. Sen has shown (though not without controversy) that the outcomes of a
Parctian efficiency approach and a liberal approach are not the samne. See generally Scn,
supra note l5.
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social rule should apply to the treatment of migrants like
Roberto in Alice's country?
Alice and Roberto both have three alternatives: x-
immigration with full equality (i.e., upon admittance) Roberto
will enjoy the full range of rights Alice does; y-immigration
without equality (i.e., Roberto can physically migrate and work
in Alice's country but he will not be included in Alice's
community and will be subject to fewer rights than those
accorded to Alice, as a temporary guest worker for example);
and finally z-no immigration at all (i.e., Roberto is refused at
the border and his migration is precluded entirely).
Alice's preferences (in decreasing order) would be z, x, y.
As a communitarian (and out of uncertainty and concern about
the effects of immigration on her own personal welfare) she
might rather not welcome immigration under any terms, but if
immigration is nevertheless allowed, her egalitarian values
mandate inclusion and equal treatment. Physical immigration
subject to exclusion from the community and discriminatory
treatment is to her the least attractive result.
In contrast, Roberto's preference ordering is x, y z. His first
choice would be inclusive and non-discriminatory admittance, as
an immigrant with full rights. Moreover, he believes that
immigration with social exclusion and discrimination will still
improve his quality of life. The alternative that leaves no chance
of migration is least desirable to him.
What is the proper social choice among these alternatives,
taking into account both Alice's and Roberto's preferences? A
weak Paretian rule would lead to x-open and egalitarian
migration (it is the only alternative among the three for which
Alice and Roberto share a preference, over discriminatory
immigration). Let us apply, instead, for the reasons already
explained, a Minimal Liberal rule of social choice, that is liberal
in that it grants each individual (or represented group) the
ability to determine at least one social preference.
The binary choice between x (inclusive, egalitarian
immigration) and y (immigration with discrimination) cannot
be one of the choices allocated to either Alice or Roberto,
because x is a preference that is common to both of them, and
would therefore not fulfill the terms of Minimal Liberal analysis.
This leaves us with two choices to be made, x/z, and y/z.
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Now, if the specific choice were between x (inclusive
immigration with equality) and z (no immigration), a Minimal
Liberal perspective valuing individual choice would arguably
follow Alice's preference and take z as superior to x (if Alice
does not wish to include Roberto in her community, society
should support this, regardless of Roberto's desire).2 This
demonstrates that Minimal Liberal analysis is not prejudicially
cosmopolitan-leaving the fundamental choice regarding
inclusion of immigrants in the incumbent community to Alice.
The second choice is between y (immigration with
exclusion and discrimination) and z (no immigration). A
Minimal Liberal framework would prefer y, following Roberto (if
Roberto is so intent on migrating that he is willing to accept
discrimination, he should be allowed to do so; even though
Alice would prefer life without Roberto, under y she is not
forced to include him in her community with equal rights-her
original preference to avoid including Roberto in her
community is respected) who must in any case be left with at
least one meaningful choice.
The outcome is therefore y-immigration permitting
"behind-the-border" discrimination. Notably, this result is not
path-dependent. Even if Roberto's y/z choice is sequenced
before Alice's x/z choice, the result is still y.
Hence, in a Minimal Liberal approach, a ban on migration
(z) might be specifically socially preferred to migration with full
rights (x) (as a binary choice made by Alice), but-counter-
intuitively-immigration with exclusion and discrimination (y)
would be the overall socially preferred alternative. This
exemplifies Sen's Liberal Paradox because in their individual
ordering of preferences, both Alice and Roberto prefer inclusive
immigration with equality over non-inclusive, discriminatory
immigration (the Paretian outcome), and yet the Minimal
Liberal outcome is of immigration with discrimination.24
This analysis presents a coherent defense of discrimination
in migration regulation. People in immigration-destination
23. One might wonder why Alice's preference to exclude Roberto takes
precedence over Roberto's preference for migration. This is because x would require
Alice to accept Roberto in her community, and so impinge on Alice's liberty, just as
Sen's "prude" would be required to read LadT Chatterly's Lover against his will.
24. See Sen, supra note 15, at 155.
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states might prefer no migration to egalitarian migration, but
migrants prefer discriminatory migration over no migration.
When immigration occurs-that is, when receiving states allow it
to happen, explicitly or implicitly-discriminatory migration
conditions prevail:
This result appears similar to Howard F. Chang's exposition
of an "immigration paradox."25 According to Chang, from a self-
interested welfare perspective, citizens in migration-receiving
countries prefer temporary immigration (non-inclusive and
likely discriminatory immigration policy), but this violates their
liberal-egalitarian ideals. Moreover, the costs of egalitarian
inclusion would be so high that ultimately, restrictive
immigration policies are adopted to the detriment of would-be
migrants.
Chang's analysis is, in fact, quite different from the Minimal
Liberal analysis suggested above, most obviously because it
focuses only on incumbent citizens' preferences and does not
factor immigrants' preferences into the analysis. Chang's
analysis is helpful in understanding the _formation of Alice's
preferences-how the communitarian-egalitarian tension leads
to a first preference of no immigration-but it does not analyze
the general social choice that would refer to both Alice and
Roberto's preferences, as a form of public reasoning. In this
sense, the present analysis begins where Chang's ends.
The analysis also differs in its conclusions. Chang's
proposed solution to the communitarian-egalitarians'
predicament is to urge them to adopt cosmopolitanism, allowing
open and egalitarian immigration. This is of course a difficult, if
not question-begging, solution, simply invalidating the
communitarian end of the spectrum; but as Chang
acknowledges, it is in any case politically unlikely. Chang's
conclusion is that guest worker programs are the best that
cosmopolitans, communitarian-egalitarians, and indeed
prospective immigrants, can hope for.
By contrast, in the present analysis, discriminatory terms of
migration are not normatively second best, even if they might be
second best from the individual perspectives of both incumbents
25. Howard F. Chang, The Inunigration Paradox: PovertY, Distributive justice, and
LiberalEgalitarnsm, 52 DEPAL L. RFV. 759, 764 (2003).
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and migrants. Neither would discrimination in migration
regulation be a compromise between different positions. It is
simply the proper outcome of a social choice rule based on
individual choices. Vithin this framework, discriminatory
migration is therefore morally vindicated.
III. AB USIVE DISCRIMINATION
Does this mean that all discrimination in migration
regulation is justified in the Minimal Liberal framework? After
all, a key element of the analysis is that Roberto prefers being
treated unequally as an immigrant over remaining in his home
country. Perhaps conditions in Roberto's country are so bad that
even abusive discrimination in Alice's country is acceptable to
him. One can imagine that impoverished immigrants are often
willing to suffer abusive treatment in immigration-receiving
countries, and even embark to the new country with the
foreknowledge that they will be degraded. Does the analysis
therefore justify abusive discrimination against immigrants? One
could argue that if Roberto is willing to forfeit his rights-
including not only freedom from discrimination, but also
freedom from humiliation-he should be allowed to do so. An
analysis of the "optimal contract" between immigration-
receiving states and immigrants could lead to a similar
conclusion. Cox and Posner justify discrimination between types
of migrants on a contractual basis, arguing that immigrants who
make lower "country-specific investments" (e.g., temporary
immigrants, in comparison with permanent immigrants) value
their immigrant rights less.26 States are therefore justified in
minimizing the costs of endowing such immigrants with rights.
However, under this logic, temporary migrants who see no value
in any investment in their host society value their rights least,
willing to forfeit even basic rights (such as the freedom from
abusive discrimination). To avoid this outcome, Cox and Posner
simply assume that immigrants will not migrate to countries in
which their basic rights are abused.27 Sadly, this is not the case,
26. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants: An Optimal Contract
Framework, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1403, 1418-22 (2009).
27. Id. at 1407-08.
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as the multitude of cases of the abuse of immigrants' basic rights
attests.
In contrast, the present Minimal Liberal framework of
analysis takes account of immigrants' potential willingness to be
subjected to abusive discrimination, as well as of host
communities' interests in avoiding it. In other words, both
Roberto's desperation and Alice's egalitarian preferences count.
The Minimal Liberal framework can justify discrimination in
migration regulation, but not discrimination that concurrently
violates migrants' basic substantive human rights (including, for
example, core labor rights).
Let me now clarify which forms of discrimination in
migration regulation I am defending, and which forms of
discrimination I am not.
Discrimination against immigrants, whether through public
or private actions or both, too often takes the forms of
oppression, harassment, victimization, hostility, and exploitation
that violate basic human rights.29 By no means do I purport to
defend these types of discrimination. Having said that, it is
possible to distinguish between types and degrees of
discrimination, and one should not derive from the immorality
of some abhorrent practices a general rule on all discrimination
in migration regulation. This limited approach is defensible on
a few interrelated grounds.
First, egregious problems such as these are morally
problematic in themselves, regardless of the role discrimination
plays in them. Wage theft and sexual abuse are surely rights
violations that cannot be tolerated whether they are
discriminatory against migrants, or not. This is true even of
racial discrimination, which persists "regardless of immigration
28. See INT'L LABOUR ORG., Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233 (1998) (recognizing that the elimination of
discrimination in the workplace is itself a core labor right). However, this would refer
to discrimination not derived fron an immigrants status, but fromn her race. colour,
sex, etc. See id.
29. For one survey, see generally S. POVLRTY L. CTR., UNDLR SILGE: LIFL FOR Low-
INCOML L.ATINOS IN THL SOUTH (2009), IhIp://www.spicectr.org/sitcs/dcfaul/files/
downloads/UnderSiege.pdf.
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status."" Abusive discrimination against immigrants is usually
contingent upon the existence of other substantive wrongs.
Second, there is also legal ground to distinguish between
different forms of discrimination. The international law of
economic, social, and cultural rights recognizes that
nondiscrimination, as an obligation, is contingent on the
existence of substantive rights and should not be understood as
"an autonomous right to be free from discrimination.",1 In civil
and political rights, nondiscrimination is similarly guaranteed
with respect to substantive protected rights,2 as well as in the
more specific principle of equality "before the law," requiring
only "in this respect" "equal and effective protection" against
discrimination.a These might be difficult distinctions to draw,
but they permit us to distinguish between discrimination in
migration regulation that relates to self-standing violations of
rights and discrimination that does not.
Third, discrimination can exist even when there is no
violation of substantive rights, within the policy space that lies
above autonomous human rights. Such discrimination should
be assessed on its own merits-such as aims, effects and
30. Id. at 32. But s James A. Goldston, Holes in the Rights Framework. Racial
Disc rmnatin, Citizenship, and the Rights of Non-Citizens, 20 ETHICS & INT'l XFF. 321,
322-35 (2006) (demonstrating how citizenship and immigration laws are used for the
abuse of racial and ethnic minorities).
31. See M. MAGDALENA SEPTLVEDA, THE NATURE OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
COVLNANT ON ECONOIc, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RiGHTS 380 (2003). The United
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has opined, that "[t]he
Covenant rights apply to everyone including non-nationals. such as refugees, asylum-
seekers, stateless persons, migrant workers and victims of international trafficking,
regardless of legal status and documentation." Comm. on Econ., Social and Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 42nd Sess., 1 30, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009) [hereinafter
General Comment No. 20]. It did not go so far, however, to say that these rights must
be applied equally to Citizens and non-citizens. Id.
32. See ICCPR, supra note 11; see also UN Human Rights Comm'n. General
Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination (1989), in Compilation of General Comments
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty bodies, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (May 12, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment 18] (noting that
Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") limits
the scope of the rights to be protected against discrimination to those provided for in
the covenant).
33. See ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 26. The Human Rights Committee ("HRC") has
opined that the "enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing, however, does
not mean identical treaLntc[ in every instance." General Comment No. 18, supra note
32, [ 8.
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proportionality. 4 For example, minimum wage rules establish a
substantive standard of adequate remuneration but do not
guarantee equality, and different occupations and qualities
command different incomes. Gender-based pay discrimination
can be pursued in salary tiers well above minimum wage, but in
this case "equal pay for equal work" laws intervene, establishing
nondiscrimination as a principle that detaches itself from a
substantive norm. In short, not all discrimination was created
equal.
Fourth, focusing on the worst treatment of migrants (which
is usually also discriminatory, at least in orderly legal
environments that otherwise prevent such objectionable
conduct against incumbents) hardens and "absolutizes" the
normative approach to discrimination, obscuring the relative
nature of discriminatory wrongs. Being harassed by police or
denied access to justice simply because one is an immigrant is
surely different from receiving lower wages, paying a higher tax,
or enjoying less comprehensive healthcare insurance. In order
to assess discrimination in immigration regulation, we must treat
its worse manifestations-what I have referred to as "abusive"
discrimination-separately from other forms of discrimination,
not because they are somehow unimportant, but rather because
they are the easy cases.
Let's return to Alice and Roberto, who now have four
alternatives to choose from. As before, egalitarian immigration
(x) or no immigration (z) can be chosen, but now also two
distinct types of potential discrimination after immigrant
admission: abusive discrimination that concurrently violates
Roberto's substantive human rights (e.g., he will be denied
effective legal protection, or will be employed under conditions
tantamount to slavery)-marked as y;; and discrimination that
does not (e.g., Roberto's employment will be restricted to
certain jobs, or he will be paid less than Alice for the same work,
or receive fewer social benefits)-marked as y2.
As before, Alice initially prefers no immigration, but if
immigrants are admitted she would ideally prefer an egalitarian
standing; between the alternative scenarios of discrimination,
she strongly prefers that Roberto's human rights not be violated.
34. See General Comment No. 20, supra note 31, [ 13.
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Alice's preferences are ordered (best-first to worst-last) z, x, Y2, YI.
Roberto, however, is so intent on migration that he is willing to
forfeit some of his autonomous human rights and face abuse.
Non-abusive discrimination would be far better; ideally, he
would wish to be treated equally and enter Alice's community.
Hence, Roberto's preferences, in diminishing order are x, y2v y. z.
Importantly, this formulation explicitly takes into account
Roberto's (reluctant) propensity to enter into a situation in
which he will be discriminated against in ways that violate his
substantive human rights, by ordering y, over z. Notably, both
Alice and Roberto prefer egalitarian immigration to
discriminatory migration policy, and that to abusive
discrimination. They part ways on the question of whether no
immigration is the better alternative or not.
Let us again apply the Minimal Liberal framework. As
before, if the only choice is between z and x (no immigration
and egalitarian immigration, respectively), Alice's choice should
prevail, and on the same grounds. If the only choice is between z
and y 1 -no immigration and abusive discrimination-again,
Alice's choice should prevail, on the grounds that she should
not be forced to tolerate the committal of human rights abuses
in her own country because human rights are a central tenet of
her community values. This leaves the third and final possible
choice between z and y2, 3 which should be left to Roberto (he
must still determine at least one choice), who clearly prefers the
latter. Consequently, under a Minimal Liberal rule of social
choice, no immigration is preferred to both egalitarian and
abusively discriminatory migration, but non-abusive
discrimination in migration policy is superior to no
immigration. The outcome is y2, but not y;: discrimination is
tolerated, but not any discrimination. Discrimination that
concurrently violates substantive human rights is unjustified.
The Liberal Paradox and the Paretian bias towards
cosmopolitan outcomes holds: on a weak Paretian basis, the
outcome would have been x (egalitarian immigration), because
both Alice and Roberto prefer it to T; and T2. Furthermore, this
outcome is not path-dependent. Had the choice z/y2 been left to
35. Choices xl, x/v2, and yl/y2 are excluded: in each of them Alice and
Roberto have shared preferences, and would not satisfy the conditions of the Minimal
Liberal franework.
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Alice, leaving the choice z/y; to Roberto, the social choice
outcome would have been yi, resulting in an apparent
justification of abusive and discriminatory treatment of
migrants. This is false, because under Minimal Liberal
conditions, leaving the choice between z and 2 (no immigration
vs. non-abusive discrimination) to Alice would not be justified in
the same way that allocating the choice between z and T, to her
would be. While Alice has a direct interest in preventing
members of her community from abusing human rights, she has
no direct moral interest in preventing non-abusive
discrimination against immigrants that are not admitted to her
community. Positing otherwise would require Alice to extend
her preference for nondiscrimination not only to immigrants to
her country but to people anywhere-and that would be a
cosmopolitan view that has not been ascribed to her.
Two variants of this analysis are worth considering. One
suggests that I have been too careless in formulating Roberto's
preferences; another suggests that I have been too charitable
with Alice. In the first variant, Roberto is not keen enough on
migration so as to accept abuse. His preference ordering then
changes from x, y, y, z to (the more sensible, perhaps) x, y Z, ',
while Alice's preferences stay the same. The outcome in this case
does not change, and is justified a fortiori: both Alice and
Roberto now prefer z to Ti. Alice prefers z to x, but Roberto
prefers y2 to z. This is essentially the same as the general case of a
three-way choice between equal treatment, discrimination and
no immigration, discussed in Part III above.
The second variant exposes Alice as a merely hypocritical
egalitarian. Vhile she prioritizes the alternative of no
immigration (z), for selfish reasons her second-best choice is not
egalitarian immigration (x), but non-abusive discriminatory
migration regulation (y2), which is less costly and threatening to
her community (indeed, she might even prefer abusive
discrimination to egalitarian immigration, because it might
deter immigration altogether). Her preferences would then be
Z, Y2 , y1 (or in the worst case, z, y2, yl, x). However, taking both
Alice's and Roberto's preferences into account, the social
preference remains-discrimination in migration regulation,
without abuses of substantive human rights.
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IV. MIGRATION-ENC OURAGING AND MIGRATION-
DETERRING DISCRIMINA TION
The question now arises, what is discrimination in
migration policy good for? Why undertake a moral justification of
discrimination?
The answer is that discrimination (and to belabor the point
of the previous section, I mean only non-abusive discrimination)
can be an effective tool for regulating migration. It can
encourage and increase labor migration beneficial to migrants,
their families and their home countries. Yet, conversely, some
forms of discrimination in migration regulation can deter
immigration.
It is easiest to clarify this difference-between migration-
encouraging and migration-deterring discrimination-through
concrete examples. There are many illustrations, but here I will
refer to the Israeli labor migration case of Bukhris,16 and a series
of cases in the European Court ofJustice ("ECJ") relating to the
employment conditions of citizens of one Member State working
in another Member State. I will subject the two types of
discrimination to the Minimal Liberal framework, examining
whether either of them should be considered as justifiable.
The Bukhris petition to the Israeli Supreme Court had all
the trappings of a landmark immigration case. National
legislation relating to migrant workers was being challenged on
the basis of international law. The general claim was
discrimination. The legislation established a tax calculated as
eight percent of a migrant worker's overall income (the "Tax"),
that was not applied to local workers. The Tax, the petitioners
argued, discriminated against migrant workers, violating
international norms of labor rights, double taxation, and
international trade. Yet the Court rejected all of the petitioners'
claims, on technical legal bases. Ostensibly, the evil of harmful
discrimination against migrants had been upheld by the Court.
This might have been the case, but for one fact omitted
from this narrative: the petitioners were not at all migrant
workers, and they had no real stake in the petition. 7 Rather,
36. H( 2587/04 Bukhris v. Hadera Tax Assessor, unpublished [2005] (Isr.).
37. Had the Bukhris petition been sustained, employers would have been exempt
from the eight percent tax on migrant worker's overall income ("Tax") not previously
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Bukhris himself was an Israeli floriculturist who had employed
five Thai migrant workers. The second, more financially
significant petitioner in the case was a corporation engaged in
"human resources," at the time employing 373 Chinese citizens
and 238 Romanians. The petitioners were represented by a
leading Israeli tax law specialist, not by migrant rights advocates.
Although the petition seemed to focus on discriminatory
treatment of migrants, Bukhris was really about the taxation of
their employers' profits.
Bukhris therefore serves as a cautionary tale: discrimination
in migration regulation is not always what it seems. We see, for
example, that nondiscrimination arguments can be used not for
the sake of human dignity, or the enhancement of migrants'
rights, or even the preservation of communitarian values, but for
promoting the self-interest of non-immigrants. And we see that
discrimination can stem not from indifference or maliciousness
but from economic policy, acting as a tool for regulating
migration flows; in its response to the Bukhris petition, the
Israeli government was entirely frank in stating that such was the
goal of the discriminatory taxation system." The Tax,
discriminatory warts and all, was simply intended to discourage
Israeli employers from seeking foreign migrant workers, by
making their labor more expensive. In Bukhris we see an
immigration-deterring form of discrimination, at least by design,
if not in its effect.
The opposite type of discrimination-immigration-
encouraging discrimination-is discernible in a series of ECJ
cases in which the common quandary (simplified for present
purposes) was the extent to which workers from one Member
State, working in another Member State, could be granted terms
and conditions of employment that were lower than those
guaranteed in their host state. The questions have usually arisen
when a Member State or labor union insisted that equal terms of
employment be granted to foreign workers, and this was
considered by the employers of the foreign workers or the
paid and would have been able to request reinibursement of Taxes alircady paid. Not a
penny would have gone to the migrants.
38. HCJ 2587/04 Bukhris. at 3 ("The Respondents accept that the Employers' Tax
creates a negative incenLtive for the employment of foreign workers, and indeed that is
its goal.") (author's translation).
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European Commission to constitute a restriction on the
freedom of establishment or the freedom of movement of
services. The relevant European legislation, the Posted Workers
Directive (the "Directive"),39 actually mandates
nondiscrimination of employees, but that only as "a nucleus of
mandatory rules for minimum protection to be observed in the host
country by employers who post workers to perform temporary
work in the territory of a Member State where the services are
provided."11 Under the Directive, employees posted to another
Member State are guaranteed the terms and conditions of
employment in the host state, if laid out by law, regulation or
administrative provision or by collective agreements declared to
be "universally applicable," with respect to a list of employment
terms including maximum work periods and minimum rest,
minimum paid annual holidays, and minimum rates of pay.
Issues have reached the ECJ in disputes related to the
application of host state minimum requirements that are not
explicitly covered by the Directive. Thus, in Viking4' and Laval, 42
industrial action taken by labor unions in the host state (Finland
and Sweden, respectively), aimed at compelling employers to
apply the terms of host state collective agreements to foreign
"posted" workers43 was found to possibly interfere with the
freedom of establishment and the freedom of movement of
services. 44 In Riffert, a legal requirement in the German Land of
39. See generally Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework of the Provision of
Services, 1997 O.J. L 18/1 [hereinafter Posted Workers Directive].
40. Id. preamb., 1 13 (emnphasis added).
41. See Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n v. Viking Line ABP (Viking), Case C-438/05,
[2007] E.C.R. I-10779.
42. Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet (Laval), Case C
341/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-11767. For commentary, see Uladizlaui Belavusaul, The Case of
Laval in the Context of the Post-Enlargement EC Law Development, 9 GER. L.J. 2279 (2008);
A.C.L. Davies, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ 37
INDUS. L.J. 126 (2008), and Ronnie Eklund, A Swedish Perspective on Laval, 29 CoMP.
LAB. I. & POL'YJ. 551 (2008).
43. In Viking, the foreign clement was introduced by a Finnish employer's
intention to re-flag its ships to Estonia, where lower terms of employment apply. See
Viking, [2007] E.C.R. 1-10779. In Laval, the employer posted Latvian workers in
Sweden, applying Latvian terins to their cmployment. See Laval, [2007] E.C.R. 1-11767,
2.
44. See generally Norbert Reich. Free Movement v. Social Rights in an Enlarged
Union-The Laval and Viking Cases Before the E, 9 GLR. L. J. 125 (2008). For a
European Constitutionalist critique, see Christian joerges & Florian RdI, Informal
595
596 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:575
Niedersachsen whereby service suppliers to the government
apply the terms of a local collective agreement to Polish workers,
was found by the ECJ to violate the Directive.45 And in
Commission v. Luxembourg the ECJ upheld the contentions
against Luxembourg's legislation that effectively expanded the
terms of the Directive to a broader set of labor regulations and
collective agreements. 6
What is important for present purposes, however, is the
recognition that arises from these cases, that requirements of
non-discriminatory treatment in labor migration regulation may
impede the freedom of movement. In other words, the
discrimination that was being upheld was migration-
encouragmg--in contradistinction to the type of discrimination
upheld in Bukhris, which as we have seen, was migration-
deterring.
Let us now return to the Minimal Liberal framework of
analysis. Given the choice between migration-deterring and
migration-encouraging discrimination in migration regulation,
which would be justified by the individual preferences of Alice
and Roberto? This depends on the alignment of individual
preferences. As before, let x signify egalitarian migration and z
signify no immigration. The option of discrimination in
migration policy, y, is now split into two distinct alternatives. The
first, y*, indicates migration-encouraging discrimination; y**
indicates migration-deterring discrimination. What are Alice
and Roberto's (representative) preferences?
Roberto is the simpler case: as before he prefers egalitarian
immigration, with a second choice of discriminatory migration
policy and a worst case of no immigration. In the choice
between encouraging and deterring discrimination, in both
types of discrimination Roberto will be treated less favorably
than incumbents, but the immigration-encouraging type
increases his opportunities, and so he prefers it. His decreasing
order of preferences would be x, y*, y**, z.
Politics, Formalised Law and the Social Deficit of European Integration: Reflections After the
Judgments ofthe ECJin Viking and Laval, 15 EUR. L.J. 1 (2009).
45. See generally Riffert v. Land Niedersachsen, Case C-346/06. [2008] E.C.R. 1-
1989.
46. Conm'n v. Luxembourg, Case C-319/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-4323.
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Alice's preferences are interesting in that the distinction
between types of discrimination changes her framing of
egalitarian migration. She still prefers no immigration, but her
second choice is now (non-abusive) migration-deterring
discrimination (the logic being that it is the second-best way to
prevent immigration). Egalitarian immigration is therefore
Alice's third-best alternative, preferred only to immigration-
encouraging discrimination which would both actively increase
immigration and subject it to discriminatory terms-the worst
case from Alice's viewpoint. Alice therefore orders her
preferences z, y**, x, y*.
We see that the commonalities between Alice and Roberto's
preferences have narrowed down to one: they both prefer
egalitarian migration (x) to migration-encouraging
discrimination (y*). This leaves five choices to be aggregated. If
the only choice is between egalitarian immigration (x) and no
immigration (z), the choice should still be Alice's-no
immigration-for the same reasons as before. Between no
immigration (z) and immigration-deterring discrimination
(y**),47 however, Roberto's choice should prevail; immigration-
deterring discrimination makes few demands of admission to
Alice's community and indeed works towards the goal of less
immigration that Alice herself prefers. Between immigration-
deterring (y**) and egalitarian immigration (x), Alice's
preference again prevails, because the more inclusive option
would require her to introduce Roberto into her community.
The choice between immigration-deterring discrimination (y**)
and immigration-encouraging discrimination (y*) should follow
Roberto: neither forms of discrimination require Alice to accept
Roberto into her community, although both entail a
compromise of her egalitarian ideals. Finally, in the remaining
choice between no immigration (z) and immigration-
encouraging discrimination (y*), Roberto's choice should be
preferred, again because it will not impinge upon Alice's sense
of community. The Minimal Liberal outcome would then be y*,
putting immigration-encouraging discrimination as the ultimate
47. At this point, it is important to note that the outcome of this analysis is not
path-dependent. That is, one could now first examine the hoice between no
inunigration and unnigration-encouraging discrimination, without altering the
outcome.
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social choice (maintaining the Liberal Paradox, because in weak
Pareto terms, egalitarian migration would still have been
preferred).
Immigration-encouraging discrimination is therefore fully
justifiable under the Minimal Liberal framework of social choice
encompassing preferences in an egalitarian-communitarian
immigration-receiving state and in the state of emigration. Does
this mean that immigration-deterring discrimination is
unjustifiable? So long as the option of migration-encouraging
discrimination exists, and as long as it is Roberto's preference, it
will be superior to migration-deterrence. However, in contrast to
abusive discrimination that violates human rights of migrants,
immigration-deterring discrimination in migration policy can be
independently justified. One only need to consider the
preferences of Alice and Roberto between x, y, and z**
(compared with x, y; and z) to see that this is the case.
CONCLUSION
This analysis shows that (some) discriminatory treatment of
immigrants can be morally justified under a Minimal Liberal
rule of social choice and public reasoning. The same framework
shows that violations of substantive human rights of immigrants
should not be tolerated, permissible discrimination
notwithstanding. Finally, the Minimal Liberal analysis shows that
discrimination that encourages immigration is morally superior
to discrimination that deters it, although the latter is still morally
justifiable in this framework.
The public policy applications of this analysis are manifold,
but in general, the lesson is that inflexible demands or advocacy
for rules prohibiting all discriminatory treatment of immigrants,
whether in the context of human rights, labor rights or
economic liberalization, should be treated cautiously. There is
no question that nondiscrimination rules can impede migration
which is beneficial to migrants, their families, and their home
countries, but this is sometimes disregarded as an instrumental
claim that is trumped by deontological moral approaches.
However, in this article I have attempted to demonstrate that
some discrimination can be justified not only instrumentally but
also morally and analytically. It cannot be taken for granted that
discrimination is always wrong. In policy terms, discrimination in
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immigration policy should not be prohibited en banc as a
negative occurrence. Because at least some "behind-the-border"
discrimination against immigration can be morally justified,
different applications of discriminatory treatment should be
analyzed separately.
Ultimately, this conclusion significantly relaxes the moral
environment in which the immigration debate exists. Much of
the philosophical debate is a dialogue of the deaf, between
cosmopolitans and various forms of communitarianism. This
divide is reflected in the egalitarian-communitarian tension that
the present analysis aims to alleviate, through the use of a rule of
public reasoning that is not prejudicial towards any particular
'transcendental' moral attitude. Indeed, the approach pursued
in this article suggests a moral basis for discussion that (unlike
Paretian analysis) is largely unprejudiced towards either end of
the moral spectrum.
